⚡ Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges

Wednesday, November 10, 2021 3:12:33 PM

Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges



Lindsay Clutterbuck. When armed force is Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges, only the Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges on the ground are Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges for determining the legal classification of a situation of violence. Unfortunately, States dealing with the The Importance Of Excess In The Works Of Edgar Allen Poe of foreign fighters tend to shy away from recognizing Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges applicability of IHL to their detention. Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges situation has led States Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges international organizations Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges react by Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges existing counterterrorism measures and introducing new ones. This module is a resource for lecturers Current challenges to the international legal framework Though the increased interrelationship between asylum Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges refugee principles Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges Roe V. Wade Summary legal regimes forming the core international legal framework within which counter-terrorism responses should occur Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges positive on the one hand, not least in terms of promoting the principles of Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges of the identified Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges regimes, it Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges not without its associated Terrorism And Counterterrorism Challenges.

Lecture: The changing face of local and global terrorism - New counterterrorism challenges

Indeed, the three pillars upon which this strategy is based—leadership attrition, training of local forces, and countering violent extremism—have thus far failed to deliver a crushing blow to these terrorist groups. Indeed, until the recent gains against the Islamic State, in particular in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, a depressing pattern established itself where the United States killed terrorist leaders while they nonetheless seized more territory.

Where we downsized our military, while the flow of recruits into their ranks continued. Where our intelligence collection capabilities diminished while they more effectively encrypted their communications to plan and implement attacks and exploited digital and social media for propaganda and recruitment. Given this litany of emerging and expanding challenges, the most critical question today is whether the United States can continue to build on these latest gains to ensure sustained, long-term progress. A quarter of a century ago, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher described publicity as the oxygen of terrorism. Today, however, it is access to sanctuary and safe haven that sustains and nourishes terrorism.

The slow and fractured process of training indigenous government security forces in those regions will not do so either. The inadequacy of these training activities and efforts to build partner capacity are evidenced by the mostly unimpeded escalation of terrorist activities in all those places. Whether in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, Mali, or Somalia, our efforts to build partner capacity have all foundered.

While there has been some recent progress in Mali, Nigeria, Syria, and Iraq, it is not clear whether the past problems that undermined the performance of indigenous military units have been adequately addressed and reversed. Mali, for instance, was a model of U. A thoroughly new approach is needed to the current piecemeal training and uneven enhancement of host-nation counterterrorism capabilities. While increased U. American and allied air strikes in coordination with local ground forces have not brought any of these counterterrorist campaigns to rapid conclusion. Therefore, in tandem with both the continued use of air power and deployment of supporting American special operations forces personnel, division-size conventional U.

They have the necessary combat experience and skill-sets to sequentially eliminate terrorist strength in each of these areas and thereby enable indigenous security forces to follow in their wake to stabilize and police newly liberated places. By providing more effective governance and core services—with sustained U. The non-traditional challenges to U. The effectiveness of this strategy will be based on our capacity to think like a networked enemy, in anticipation of how they may act in a variety of situations, aided by different resources. This goal requires that the U. With this understanding in mind, we need to craft an approach that specifically takes into account the following key factors:. Separating the enemy from the populace that provides support and sustenance.

This, in turn, entails three basic missions:. Ongoing and effective neutralization of enemy propaganda and information operations through the planning and execution of a comprehensive and integrated information operations and holistic civil affairs campaign in harmony with the first four tasks;. Between the police and municipal authorities, the city's program encompasses both anti-radicalization and counter-radicalization approaches. Ignoring the context and focusing only on the mechanics of the program will compound the difficulty of judging its success. The country where the programs are taking place and the socio-political norms of that country are key contextual elements.

For example, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and Indonesia have all pioneered deradicalization programs that aim to deradicalize captured terrorists or insurgents. Morocco has taken perhaps the most comprehensive approach of all the Muslim countries, from actively reinforcing and promoting its own traditional Maliki form of Islamic law to producing a government-approved curriculum for imams to use. The king of Morocco plays a personal role in the lives of his subjects as the "Commander of the Faithful" and hence is able to shape opinions in Morocco in a way that would be difficult or impossible even for other Muslim countries to achieve.

There are also significant differences among European countries, as well as between European countries and the United States. They include the recognition in a number of European countries, such as Germany and the Netherlands, that radicalization is a process that can be driven by ideologies other than that of violent jihadism. Consequently, there is a history of intervention through state and local anti-radicalization programs to prevent and disengage from radicalization that is motivated by different causes and ideologies.

The prevailing socioeconomic and political situations within a society—whether it is predominantly stable and subject to the rule of law or whether it is suffering from widespread or intense civil conflict or insurgency—can also have an impact on which deradicalization measures are appropriate and necessary see Table 1. Arguably, the more a country deviates from a predominantly peaceful state and into violent civil conflict, insurgency, or terrorism, the less effective anti-radicalization and counter radicalization programs are likely to be.

The second set of contextual elements to be considered when examining deradicalization programs are the local conditions under which the program operates. Each of these categories are different, and therefore a different type of program is required for trying to deal with each of them. Finally, the degree of freedom the individual has and hence the degree of control that can be exerted over him or her is also an important element and can be broken down into three main levels depending on whether the subjects of the program are incarcerated in some way; whether they are living freely but are likely to be detained if their behavior continues on current trajectories; or whether they are living freely and openly in society.

In summary, so-called deradicalization programs can differ from each other not only in the aims, objectives and the methods they employ but also in the wider societal context under which they operate. This context includes the local conditions prevailing in the country where they are located, the type of behavior being targeted, and the degree of control that those responsible for delivering the program are able to exert over the targeted individuals. Without taking these into full consideration, any attempt to evaluate the performance of a specific program will be incomplete. Undoubtedly, all programs and initiatives are created with the intention of achieving positive outcomes. However, even when the desired outcomes are achieved, the programs may also have unforeseen and undesired consequences.

One of the main objectives of Prevent was to preclude the development of a new generation of Al Qaeda—inspired terrorists in the United Kingdom. The Prevent strand also consists of a number of other programs aimed at countering radicalization. Appropriate community interventions can then be determined and implemented. However, the strong police involvement in Channel has proven to be controversial, with allegations being made that individuals are becoming criminalized through its activities.

The use of police officers dedicated to understanding community dynamics and the activities of extremist and terrorist groups predates the Channel program and was traditionally carried out by the special branch of each force. They are fundamentally different from intelligence-gathering work by the police, such as the use of individuals as informants paid or unpaid and the recruitment of longer term paid and tasked intelligence sources.

A UK Parliamentary enquiry in found that the single aim of the Prevent strand of the government's counterterrorism strategy to reduce the risks posed by growing Al Qaeda influence in the UK had created other problems at the community level. As a consequence, Muslim communities have come to see themselves as the sole target of counterterrorism programs and to feel that they are all viewed by the state as potential terrorists due to the actions of a small minority within their communities.

In turn, they perceive that overt, counter, or anti-radicalization programs specifically Channel are being used as a means to gather intelligence on their communities, including individuals who have not committed criminal offences. Also, since pre-existing mainstream funding was diverted to pay for the Prevent program, this led some non-Muslim communities to feel that they are missing out on financial support for other projects. At the same time, some communities deliberately played up or emphasized the Muslim aspects of their identity as a means to gain an advantage in securing funds.

The UK experience shows that no program of this type should be undertaken lightly. Potential issues must be identified, carefully considered, and then robustly managed. A report from that analyzed terrorist groups existing between and concluded that there were two main reasons for their elimination. Deradicalization, particularly counter radicalization and anti-radicalization programs, can contribute to bringing about both of these outcomes and can do so in two ways:. Individuals who become deradicalized and disengage from a terrorist group—either with the assistance of a formal program or on their own such "self-deradicalization" is often precipitated by disillusionment with the cause or disenchantment with the group they were in —can sometimes be persuaded to "throw in their lot" with the government and actively assist in the defeat of their former comrades.

One of the earliest indications that deradicalized actors could be of benefit to counterterrorism operations was seen in Malaya during the "Emergency" of the s. Although the parallels are limited between this example and more recent counterterrorism operations taking place in conditions outside of wide-spread insurgencies or civil conflict, it does illustrate the potential presented by individuals involved in terrorist activities and groups who have become "deradicalized. The MNLA example also highlights an ethical dilemma for contemporary counterterrorism organizations. Once individuals have disengaged, should the goal be to assist them in leaving their terrorist organizations or networks, or should it be to convince them to remain and gather intelligence?

If this is the case, then they must ensure that any well-placed individuals acting on their behalf can help achieve this end. Perhaps just as importantly as above, deradicalization, and more specifically counter-radicalization and anti-radicalization, can sometimes play a role in "turning off the tap" of terrorist recruitment by reducing the flow of individuals likely to become committed enough to a terrorist cause to take action on its behalf. At the beginning of the terrorist recruitment cycle, anti-radicalization measures can be used to reduce the pool of those vulnerable to extremist propaganda, while counter-radicalization measures are used to reduce the numbers of those "transitioning to terrorism" before those willing to join terrorist groups actually succeed in doing so.

In addition, successful initial targeting of those who are potentially willing to join if the opportunity arises makes it riskier and more difficult for terrorist groups or networks to identify, "groom," and recruit individuals. At this point, the question must be asked whether any counterterrorism strategy can afford not to include organized attempts to target radicalization and individuals subjected to it. The following example may help to provide an answer. Hasib Hussain was 18 years old when he detonated an improvised explosive device IED on a London bus on July 7 th , , killing 13 people. This made him the youngest of the four July 7 conspirators as well as the youngest of the 38 individuals involved in the six most significant terrorist plots in the United Kingdom between and I mean should someone have challenged that?

When early detection of radicalization may be possible, yet there is a lack of counter mechanisms other than law enforcement measures, a situation could occur where the criminal law becomes stretched or misapplied in an effort to deal with the issue. This in turn could lead to resentment among communities that may already feel targeted, perhaps even launching individuals into radicalization or empowering those already in the process of radicalizing.

Ultimately the risk to themselves and to society will then have increased. Recent examples in the United States illustrate a different approach to dealing with radicalized individuals who are seeking to make a transition into terrorism. In both cases, the FBI was in contact with the accused for an extended period prior to the arrests. In addition, there have been reports that the terrorists involved in the Paris attacks that killed persons used encrypted communications as part of their successful effort to avoid detection.

Meanwhile, improved technology also has played a major role in the Obama administration's countermeasures, along with a variety of less spectacular programs. A case in point is the increased use of improved armed drones in recent years, to attack terrorists in trouble areas ranging from Afghanistan to Libya. The Bush administration began using drones but their use was greatly stepped up during the Obama administration. Reconnaissance drones and electronic surveillance methods also have been improved.

In less known efforts, the Administration has continued to develop and expand public diplomacy and counter violent extremism CVE programs to try to counter the radicalization of youths in the United States and other countries. The efforts, ranging from using the internet to get into chat rooms to counter some of the recruiting messages, are hard to quantify and have come under criticism, but they are an example of using internet technology to counter the radical Islamist groups recruiting machine.

Thus, the internet and its various uses--or misuses--have presented increased challenges to the counterterrorism effort during the past seven years of the Obama administration although much of the basic technology was developed much earlier. Kraft is a retired State Department counterterrorism official. They are co-authors of "Evolution of U. Counterterrorism Policy" and are working on a new book covering developments during the Obama administration.

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